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Abstract. We investigate international negotiations on CO2 emissions reduction in the Ky-
oto Protocol by non-cooperative multilateral bargaining theory. The negotiation model has
two phases, (i) allocating emission reductions to countries and (ii) international emissions
trading. Anticipating the competitive equilibrium of emissions trading, each country evalu-
ates an agreement of reduction commitments. We formulate the negotiation process as an
n-person sequential bargaining game with random proposers. We show that there exists a
unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game and that the equi-
librium emissions reduction proposed by every country converges to the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution as the probability of negotiation failure by rejection goes to zero. The
weights of countries in the asymmetric Nash solution are determined by their probabilities to
be selected as proposers. Finally, we present numerical results based on actual emission data
on the European Union (EU), the former Soviet Union (FSU), Japan and the United States
(USA).
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11 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to consider international negotiations on climate change in a
game theoretic framework. With the increase of environmental concerns in the late 1980s,
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) was signed at the Rio Earth
Summit in June 1992. The objective of the Convention was to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG)
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. Developed countries promised to return their emissions
of CO2 and other GHGs to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The Convention, however, lacked
any legally binding commitments, and this voluntary approach was not successful. The third
Conference of the Parties (COP3) to the Convention was held at Kyoto on 1-10 December
1997. The objective of the Kyoto conference was to adopt a “legally-binding protocol or other
legal instrument”3 committing developed countries to reducing their GHGs emissions.
More than 150 developed and developing countries attended the Kyoto conference. Inten-
sive negotiations took place during the conference, and the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention
was ﬁnally agreed.4 The key contents of the Protocol are summarized as follows. First, Annex
I countries (OECD countries and countries in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern
Europe) as a whole reduce emissions by 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012
(Article 3). Secondly, the quantiﬁed emission limitation or reduction commitment (QELRC)
is assigned to each Annex I country (Article 4 and Annex B). The reduction rates of ma-
jor emitting countries are as follows: Russia and Ukraine 0%; Japan 6%; the United States
3Ministerial Declaration at COP2, 8-19 July 1996. http://unfccc.int/sessions/cop2/l17.pdf
4The agreement was reached late in the morning of 11 December, 36 hours after the oﬃcial deadline. For
a detailed survey of the Kyoto Protocol, see Grubb et al.(1999). The full text of the protocol is available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
2(USA) 7%; and the European Union (EU) 8%. Thirdly, the Protocol includes three “ﬂexible”
mechanisms for international emission transfer such as joint implementation (Article 6), the
clean development mechanism (Article 12), and emissions trading (Article 17).
In this paper, we present a game theoretic model of international negotiations on the
Kyoto Protocol. Our analysis is focused on reduction commitments of CO2 emissions and
emissions trading. The bargaining model has two consecutive stages, (i) allocating emission
reductions to countries and (ii) international emissions trading. We assume that emissions
trading takes place in a competitive market and that given a total target of emissions, the
eﬃcient reductions (minimizing the total reduction costs) can be attained across the coun-
tries in the emissions market. This enables us to solve the two-stage model by backward
induction. Given the competitive equilibrium of emissions trading, the whole bargaining
model of allocating emissions can be reduced to the n-person unanimous bargaining problem
where an agreement requires the unanimous consent of countries. The countries evaluate the
agreement of emissions allocation by their net costs after trading in the competitive emissions
market.
We formulate a negotiation process on emission reductions by non-cooperative multilateral
bargaining theory (see Selten 1981, Chatterjee et al. 1993, Moldovanu and Winter 1995,
Okada 1996, among others).5 Speciﬁcally, our model is based on the sequential bargaining
game with random proposers introduced by Moulin (1984) and Okada (1996), which is a
generalization of the Rubinstein’s (1982) two-person alternating-oﬀers model.
The negotiation process consists of a (possibly) inﬁnite sequence of bargaining rounds.
5These works treat multilateral bargaining situations where coalitions of players are allowed to form. The
model in this paper can be extended to such a general situation. See Okada (1996).
3In the beginning of each round, every country is randomly selected as a proposer according
to a predetermined probability distribution. If selected, a country proposes an allocation
of emissions. All other countries either accept or reject the proposal sequentially. If all
responders accept the proposal, then the proposal is agreed upon. If any country rejects the
proposal, then negotiations can proceed to the next round with some positive probability
and the same process is repeated. Negotiations, however, may stop with the remaining
probability. The disagreement point of negotiations describes countries’ costs in the failure
of negotiations.
We show that there exists a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) of the
negotiation process, and moreover that the equilibrium proposal by every country converges
to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as the stopping probability of negotiations goes
to zero. The weights of countries in the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution are determined
by their probabilities to be selected as proposers.
In the second part of the paper, we present numerical results based on actual emission data
on EU, FSU, Japan and USA. Employing the marginal costs of CO2 emissions abatement
estimated by Nordhaus (1991), we compute the competitive equilibrium price ($9.45 per
carbon ton) in emissions trading among the four countries. Based on the numerical results,
we discuss how the reduction commitments by the Kyoto Protocol can be supported by the
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution under three diﬀerent kinds of weight: equal weight,
population weight and GDP weight.
The actual negotiations in the Kyoto conference involve many unknown factors which
can be hardly analysed by any formal model. The Kyoto Protocol may be understood best
as the outcome of an unseen political process, compromising various conﬂicting objectives.
4Nevertheless, in our view, it is important to consider negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol
by the formal methodology of game theory. A game theoretical model clariﬁes the strategic
structure of international negotiations on the Protocol, and enables us to scrutinize on what
kind of rational basis the Protocol is established. It helps us to understand a very complicated
negotiation process on climate change from the strategic viewpoint of countries, and gives us
quantative predictions on the emissions trading.
As far as we know, there are few game-theoretical works on the Kyoto Protocol. In our
previous work (Okada 2002), we analyse negotiations on the Protocol by cooperative game
theory. The negotiations on reduction commitments are formulated as a cooperative voting
game. Several allocation rules (including the Kyoto Protocol) are evaluated from viewpoints
of three major emitting countries, FSU, Japan and USA, based on the same empirical data
as in this paper. The cooperative game approach has the diﬃculty that the stability is very
restrictive: the set of stable outcomes (deﬁned by the core solution) of the voting game is
non-empty if and only if there exists at least one country possessing veto power. Unlike in the
UN Security Council, however, all negotiating players are symmetric regarding the veto power
in the international negotiations on climate change. By this reason, the unanimous voting
rule where every country has a veto power is the most relevant for international negotiations
on climate change. Then, the result of the cooperative game is vacant in that all allocations
of emissions can be stable. The non-cooperative game approach in this paper overcomes
this diﬃculty. It can select the (asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution as an unique SSPE
of the barganing process. Non-cooperative behavior of countries is critical in international
negotiations without any centralized power. Barrett (1992) analyses “acceptable”6 allocation
6In the game theoretic terminology, the acceptability here means the individual rationality that each
5schemes of emissions among China, FSU and USA, and demonstrates by empirical data that
the uniform percentage abatement rule is preferred by these countries, without an analysis
of bargaining procedure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a game-theoretic model of interna-
tional negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol. The properties of a competitive equilibrium of
emissions trading are reviewed. Section 3 presents a non-cooperative bargaining procedure
on emissions reduction. The main theorem is proved. Section 4 presents numerical results on
the competitive equilibrium of emissions trading among EU, FSU, Japn and USA. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Let N = f1;¢¢¢;ng be the set of countries. For every i 2 N, we denote by Ei country i’s
current level of CO2 emissions. The total level of CO2 emitted by n countries is given by
E =
P
i2N Ei. Let xi denote country i’s reduction of CO2 emissions where 0 · xi · Ei. The
CO2 abatement cost function of country i is denoted by Ci(xi). It is assumed that Ci(xi)
is a diﬀerentiable, strictly convex and monotonically increasing function on R+, the set of
all non-negative real numbers. Let MCi(xi) denote the marginal abatement cost function of
country i. For a natural number s = 1;2;¢¢¢; notation Rs
+ means the non-negative orthant
of the s-dimensional Euclidean space Rs.
Our game theoretic model of international negotiations on climate change has the fol-
country’s net beneﬁt is at least as great under an allocation as it would be if negotiations failed.
6lowing two consecutive phases, (i) negotiations on emission allocations, and (ii) emissions
trading.
In the ﬁrst phase of negotiations, n countries negotiate on an allocation of emissions. Let
!i denote an amount of emission permits allocated to country i. Country i has to reduce
Ei ¡ !i amount of emissions if emissions trading is impossible. An emission allocation is
formulated by a vector ! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) 2 Rn
+. The total amount of CO2 emission permits is
given by ! =
Pn
i=1 !i. In this paper, we assume that the total emissions target !, 0 < ! < E,
is exogenously determined by scientiﬁc knowledge and that it is not an issue of negotiations.
The agreement of an emission allocation ! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) satisfying ! =
Pn
i=1 !i is reached
by the unanimous consent among n countries. The negotiation process will be described in
Section 3.
In the second phase of negotiations, n countries negotiate to sell and buy their emission
permits, given the initial emission allocation ! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) agreed in the ﬁrst phase of
negotiations. We assume that the emissions trading takes place in a competitive market. The
competitive equilibrium of emissions trading is eﬃcient in the sense that the total reduction
costs across n countries attaining the emission target ! is minimized.
Let p be a market price of emissions and let xi be an actual level of emissions reduction
by country i after the trading.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A competitive equilibrium of international CO2 emissions trading with an
initial emission allocation ! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) 2 Rn














The minimum value of the optimization problem (1),
ce
i ´ Ci(x¤
i) + p¤(Ei ¡ x¤
i ¡ !i) (3)
is called the competitive equilibrium reduction cost for country i.
The deﬁnition can be explained as follows. If country i wants to reduce CO2 emissions
by xi from Ei, it must possess Ei ¡ xi amounts of emission permits. If the initial allocation
!i of emissions is less than this level, country i has to purchase Ei ¡ xi ¡ !i amounts of
emission permits from other countries. Equation (1) means that every country i minimizes
its CO2 abatement net costs, given the equilibrium price p¤ of emissions. Equation (2) is the
balancedness condition of demand and supply for emission permits.
We review the standard properties of the competitive equilibrium. If x¤
i is an interior
solution of country i’s cost minimizing problem (1), then the well-known principle of marginal
cost pricing must hold:
p¤ = MCi(x¤
i) for all i 2 N (4)
where MCi is the marginal reduction cost function of country i. It can be proved that the
8equilibrium emission reduction x¤ = (x¤
1;¢¢¢;x¤
n) minimizes the total reduction costs for n












(Ei ¡ !i): (5)
We denote by c(¯ !) the minimum value of the total emissions reduction costs in (5) given the
emission target ¯ !.
Since a competitive equilibrium (p¤;x¤
1;¢¢¢;x¤
n) 2 Rn+1
+ of the emissions trading can be
characterized as a solution of the balancedness equation (2) of demand and supply and the
marginal cost pricing equation (4), it is important to remark that the competitive equilibrium
(p¤;x¤
1;¢¢¢;x¤
n) is determined solely by the total reduction r = E ¡ ¯ !, given the marginal
abatement cost functions of n countries. Since the total reduction level r is ﬁxed throughout
the analysis, we represent the competitive equilibrium reduction cost ce
i for country i in (3)
simply as a function ce
i(!i) only of the initial emissions !i assigned to country i, independent
of those assigned to other countries. The function ce
i is called the competitive equilibrium
reduction cost function of country i.
We summarize the properties of a competitive equilibrium of international CO2 emissions
trading in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the competitive equilibrium of the international CO2 emissions trading
with an initial emission allocation ! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) 2 Rn
+, the emission price p¤ and the
emission reduction vector x¤ = (x¤
1;¢¢¢;x¤
n) 2 Rn
+ are solely determined by the total emission
target ¯ ! =
P
i2N !i. Given ¯ !, the equilibrium reduction x¤ = (x¤
1;¢¢¢;x¤
n) is eﬃcient so that
9it can minimize the total reduction costs for n countries to attain the emission target ¯ !. The
equilibrium reduction cost ce
i(!i) of every country i is a decreasing function of the initial




i(!i) = c(¯ !) (6)
where c(¯ !) is the total equilibrium reduction costs deﬁned by the optimal value of (5).
When countries negotiate on emission allocations, they can anticipate the competitive
equilibrium of international emissions trading. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that countries
evaluate every emission allocation by their equilibrium reduction costs after emissions trading
given the allocation. Equation (6) shows that the bargaining problem on emission allocations
can be considered as a cost allocation problem where every country wants more emission
permits to decrease its reduction costs. A dynamic model of the negotiation process on
emission allocations will be described in the next section.
Remark. In this paper, we investigate the outcome of emissions trading by applying the
competitive equilibrium in price theory. An alternative approach is to apply some solution
concept (the Shapley value, for example) in cooperative game theory. To do this, an n-
person game in coalitional form can be constructed as follows. Every subset S of N is called
a coalition of countries. All member countries in coalition S jointly minimize their total costs
of emission reduction by reallocating emission permits within the coalition. The total cost of












(Ei ¡ !i); 0 · xi · Ei; for any i 2 S;
assuming
P
i2S(Ei ¡ !i) ¸ 0. The ﬁrst constraint means that coalition S as a whole should
not emit CO2 more than the sum of emission permits assigned to all member countries. Let
C!(S) denote the minimum cost above. It can be easily seen that the cost function C! of
coalitions is sub-additive: C!(S [ T) · C!(S) + C!(T) for any S and T with S \ T = ;.
Formally, a cooperative game of international CO2 emissions trading is deﬁned by a pair
(N;C!). For detailed discussions on cooperative games, see Shubik (1983).
3 A Non-cooperative Bargaining Process of Emissions Reduc-
tion
We describe a non-cooperative bargaining process of emissions reduction in the ﬁrst nego-
tiation phase brieﬂy explained in the last section. The negotiation can be formulated as
the n-person unanimous bargaining problem in the literature of the bargaining theory. Let
! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) 2 Rn
+ be an emission allocation for n countries satisfying
P
i2N !i = ¯ !,
and let Ω be the set of all emission allocations !. Every country i evaluates an allocation
! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) by its competitive equilibrium reduction cost ce
i(!i) given in (3). The
agreement of ! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) is reached by the unanimous consent of all n countries.
11To complete the description of the unanimous bargaining problem, we need to specify the
disagreement point which shows what would happen in the case that negotiations fail. It is
very diﬃcult for us to estimate the diagreement point of the international negotiations on the
Kyoto Protocol. There exist a lot of uncertain factors on climate change in environmental
and economic aspects. Also, the failure of the Kyoto conference will cause further political
uncertainty in international negotiations. Due to the diﬃculty to estimate future events
in the case of negotiations failure, we simply assume in this paper that the breakdown of
negotiations in the Kyoto conference delays the prevention of global warming and thus that
each country i has to be burdened with some exogenous cost di. We assume
X
i2N
di > c(¯ !): (7)
This condition means that the diagreement in the Kyoto conference causes higher reduction
costs for countries as a whole than it would be under the Kyoto Protocol. The disagreement
point of negotiations is given by d = (d1;¢¢¢;dn) 2 Rn
+. By agreeing to an emission allocation
! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n), each country i can save its reduction costs by di ¡ ce
i(!i).
Deﬁnition 2. The unanimous bargaining problem of CO2 emissions reduction is deﬁned to
be a triplet B = (Ω;d;(ce
i)i2N) where Ω is the set of all emission allocations ! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) 2
Rn
+ for n countries satisfying
P
i2N !i = ¯ !, d = (d1;¢¢¢;dn) 2 Rn
+ the disagreement point
satisfying (7), and ce
i the competitive equilibrium reduction cost function of country i deﬁned
in (3).
12Before presenting a formal model of the negotiation process, we deﬁne a cooperative
solution of the unanimous bargaining problem introduced by Nash (1950).
Deﬁnition 3. The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution of the unanimous bargaining prob-
lem B = (Ω;d;(ce
i)i2N) with a weight vector ® = (®1;¢¢¢;®n) 2 Rn
+ is the optimal solution
! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) of the maximization problem
max (d1 ¡ ce
1(!1))®1 ¢ ¢¢¢ ¢ (dn ¡ ce
n(!n))®n
s.t. (i) ! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) 2 Ω
(ii) ce
i(!i) · di for all i = 1;¢¢¢;n
where ce
i is the competitive equilibrium reduction cost function of country i.7
The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution maximizes the weighted product of all countries’
saving costs from emissions trading. The following proposition characterizes the asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution.
Proposition 2. If the disagreement point d = (d1;¢¢¢;dn) satisﬁes ce
i(0) ¸ di for all i 2 N,
then the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution ! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) of the unanimous bargaining
problem B = (Ω;d;(ce
i)i2N) for n countries with a weight vector ® = (®1;¢¢¢;®n) 2 Rn
+










Proof. We ﬁrst remark that the optimal solution of the maximization problem in Deﬁnition
3 is unchanged when we replace the objective function (d1 ¡ce
1(!1))®1 ¢ ¢¢¢ ¢(dn ¡ce
n(!n))®n
with the logarithmic value of it. That is, the Nash bargaining solution ! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n) with
the weight vector ® = (®1;¢¢¢;®n) is the optimal solution of the maximization problem
max ®1 ¢ log(d1 ¡ ce
1(!1)) + ¢¢¢ + ®n ¢ log(dn ¡ ce
n(!n))
s.t. (i) !1 + ¢¢¢ + !n = ¯ !;
(ii) !i ¸ 0 for all i = 1;¢¢¢;n;
(iii) ce
i(!i) · di for all i = 1;¢¢¢;n
The assumption that ce
i(0) ¸ di for all i 2 N imply that constraint (ii) is not binding at the
optimal solution. Constraint (iii) is not binding from (7), either. Therefore, it can be shown








+ ¸ = 0; for all i = 1;¢¢¢;n (9)
where ¸ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to constraint (i). Since we have dce
i(!i)=d!i =
¡p¤ for all i = 1;¢¢¢;n from (3) where p¤ is the competitive equilibrium price of emission,
14the theorem can be proved by (9). Q.E.D.
The condition ce
i(0) ¸ di in the proposition presumes a natural situation that country i
prefers the breakdown of negotiations to an agreement if it is assigned no permits of emission.
The proposition shows that the ratio of saving costs to the weight should be equalized across
n countries at the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. Solving (3), (6) and (8), we can
obtain an explicit formula of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution !¤ = (!¤
1;¢¢¢;!¤
n)





i(0) ¡ di + ®i(
n X
i=1
di ¡ c(¯ !))g (10)
where ce
i(0) = Ci(x¤
i) + p¤(Ei ¡ x¤
i). The emission reduction cost ce
i(!¤
i ) of country i at the
Nash bargaining solution !¤ = (!¤
1;¢¢¢;!¤
n) is given by
ce
i(!¤




We call (11) the Nash bargaining reduction cost of country i.
We now turn to our main problem to describe a bargaining process on emission reductions
in the ﬁrst phase of negotiations. We will prove that the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
can be attained as a non-cooperative equilibrium of the model, and moreover that the weight
of each country for the Nash bargaining solution can be derived endogenously from the
bargaining rule.
The bargaining process consists of a (possibly) inﬁnite sequence of bargaining rounds.
15The speciﬁc rule of the bargaining procedure is as follows..
(1) In the beginning of each round t (= 1;2;¢¢¢), every country i 2 N is randomly selected
as a proposer with a predetermined probability µi.
(2) The selected country i proposes an emission allocation !i = (!i
1;¢¢¢;!i
n) 2 Ω.
(3) All other countries in N either accept or reject the proposal !i sequentially according
to a predetermined order over N. The order of responders does not aﬀect the result in
any critical way.
(4) If all responders accept the proposal !i, then it is agreed upon. In this case, every
country j 2 N bears its competitive equilibrium reduction cost ce
j(!i
j) in the emissions
trading.
(5) If any country rejects the proposal !i, then the following events may happen. With
probability 1 ¡ " (0 < " < 1), negotiations proceed to the next round t + 1 and the
same process as in round t is repeated. The other possibility is that, with probability
", negotiations stop and all countries j 2 N are burdened with their own costs dj at
the disagreement point d = (d1;¢¢¢;dn).
(6) Every country can know perfectly past moves in the process whenever it makes a deci-
sion.
(7) All countries minimize their expected costs of emissions reduction after emissions trad-
ing.8
8In the event with probability zero that negotiations continue forever, we assume that the disagreement
point d = (d1;¢¢¢;dn) prevails.
16The ﬂowchart of the negotiation process is illustrated in Figure 1. The bargaining model
above is denoted by Γ" where " is the stopping probability of negotiations when a proposal
is rejected. The game Γ" is formally represented as an inﬁnite-length extensive game with
perfect information where all players can make their choices with perfect knowledge of all
past moves.
Insert Figure 1 about here
A (pure) strategy of every country i 2 N in the game Γ" is deﬁned to be a sequence
¾i = (¾t
i)1
t=1 of t-th round strategies ¾t
i where ¾t
i prescribes (i) a proposal in round t, and (ii)
a response policy assigning either “yes” or “no” to every possible proposal. Both a proposal
and a response policy prescribed by the strategy ¾i may depend on the history of negotiations.
We investigate a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game Γ".
Roughly, a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ" is a strategy combination ¾ = (¾1;¢¢¢;¾n)
that prescribes the optimal action to every country at every possible move of the country
in Γ", given that all other countries follow ¾. For a precise deﬁnition of a subgame perfect
equilibrium of an extensive game, see Harsanyi and Selten (1988) or a standard textbook of
game theory. A stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ" is a subgame perfect equilib-
rium in which every country’s equilibrium strategy is stationary. A stationary strategy in
Γ" prescribes a proposal and a response policy, independent of negotiation history in past
rounds. More precisely, a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ" is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4. A strategy combination ¾¤ = (¾¤
1;¢¢¢;¾¤
n) of the bargaining game Γ" is called
17a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) of Γ" if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium
with the property that for every i 2 N and every t (= 1;2;¢¢¢), the t-th round strategy ¾t
i
of country i is independent of history before round t (the response policy may depend on
history within round t).
The solution of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is employed in almost every
literature of non-cooperative multilateral bargaining models (see Baron and Ferejohn 1989,
Perry and Reny 1994, Chatterjee et al. 1993, Okada 1996 and 2000 among others).9 It
implies “forgiveness - let bygones be bygones” in the sense that countries do not treat others
unfavorably even if they were treated so in past rounds of negotiations.
In the literature of the equilibrium selection theory developed by Harsanyi and Selten
(1989), the SSPE of an extensive game satisﬁes the condition of subgame consistency which
requires that every player should behave in the same way across isomorphic subgames. In our
bargaining game Γ", all subgames starting with the beginning of all rounds can be isomorphic
since they have identical game trees. The SSPE imposes that every player should make the
same proposal whenever he is selected as a proposer, and that his response to every possible
proposal should be independent of the negotiation history in past rounds. It should be
remarked that the response surely depends on a proposal itself and an in-round history, that
is, who was a proposer and who have already accepted the proposal.
Two justiﬁcations for the SSPE may be possible. One is that negotiators representing
countries have low-capacity of information processing and thus that they tend to behave
9It is well-known that the set of non-stationary subgame perfect equilibria is very large in sequential
multilateral bargaining models like ours when the discount rate of future payoﬀs is close to zero, or when the
stopping probability of negotiations is close to zero.
18according to a simple strategy such as a stationary one. This kind of justiﬁcation based
on the strategic complexity is considered by Baron and Kalai (1993) and Chatterjee and
Sabourian (2000). The other is based on the “focal point” arguments that it is easier for
negotiators to coordinate their mutual expectations on stationary strategies. The focal point
arguments have received much attention in game theory since the pioneering work of Schelling
(1960).
We are now ready to state the main theorem that characterises an SSPE of Γ".
Theorem. There exists a unique SSPE in the bargaining game Γ" of emissions reduction.10
The expected equilibrium cost of every country in Γ" is equal to the asymmetric Nash bargain-
ing reduction cost in B = (Ω;d;(ce
i)i2N) where the weight vector is given by the probability
distribution µ = (µ1;¢¢¢;µn) for selecting proposers. Moreover, as the stopping probability
" of negotiations becomes close to zero, the emission allocation proposed by every country
converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution of B.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove the uniqueness of an SSPE in the bargaining game Γ". Let v" =
(v"
1;¢¢¢;v"
n) be the expected equilibrium cost vector of n countries in an SSPE. Suppose
that country i is selected as a proposer in the initial round. Each responder j bears the
expected cost (1¡")v"
j +"dj if negotiations break down, since the equilibrium strategies are
stationary. By backward induction, this fact implies that if country i proposes an emis-
sion allocation where all other countries j (6= i) bear no more than the expected costs
10More precisely, the equilibrium path of an SSPE is unique.
19(1¡")v"
j +"dj, the proposal is accepted by them.11 Therefore, country i bears optimally the
cost c(¯ !) ¡
P
j6=i f(1 ¡ ")v"
j + "djg if it is selected as a proposer. By the deﬁnition of the
expected cost v"
i, the following equation must hold,
v"




j + "dj)g] + (1 ¡ µi)f(1 ¡ ")v"
i + "dig; for all i 2 N: (12)
Let ¯ v =
Pn
i=1 v"
i and ¯ d =
Pn
i=1 di. Then, (12) can be arranged as
v"
i = µi[c(¯ !) ¡ (1 ¡ ")¯ v ¡ "¯ d] + (1 ¡ ")v"
i + "di; for all i 2 N: (13)
By summing both sides of (13) for all i 2 N, we obtain ¯ v = c(¯ !). By substituting this into
(13) and solving it, we can obtain
v"
i = di + µi[c(¯ !) ¡ ¯ d] for all i 2 N: (14)
That is, the expected equilibrium cost of every country i is equal to the Nash bargaining
reduction cost (11) in B with the weight vector µ = (µ1;¢¢¢;µn). Note that v"
i is independent
of ". It follows from (14) that an SSPE in Γ" must be unique. In equilibrium, every country
i proposes the emission allocation !i(") = (!i
1(");¢¢¢;!i










j +"dj for all j 6= i where ce
j is the country j’s
competitive equilibrium reduction cost given in (3).





11When responders j bear exactly the expected costs (1¡")v
"
j +"dj, they are indiﬀerent between accepting
and rejecting the proposal. However, the proposer’s cost minimization in the SSPE induces the acceptance by
responders on equilibrium path even in this case.
20posed by every country i converges to the Nash bargaining reduction costs v" = (v"
1;¢¢¢;v"
n)
as " goes to zero. Since the correspondense in (3) between an emission allocation and a
competitive equilibrium reduction cost vector is continuous and one-to-one, every country i’s
proposal !i(") converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution of B as the stopping
probability " of negotiations goes to zero. Q.E.D.
The theorem shows that the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution can be supported as
the SSPE of the bargaining model Γ² where the stopping probability ² of negotiations is
suﬃciently small. The weights of countries for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution are
determined by their probabilities to be selected as proposers. This result implies that the
bargaining power of every country comes from the opportunity to make a proposal in the
bargaining process.
4 Numerical Results
In this section, we compute the competitive equilibrium of international emissions trading
among four major emitting countries EU, FSU, Japan and USA based on actual data. The
Nash bargaining solution of the emission allocation is analysed empirically. We consider
three diﬀerent weights, equal weight, population weight, and GDP weight. By the numerical
results, we consider how the formal model of the Nash bargaining solution can explain the
actual agreement of reduction rates in the Kyoto protocol.
The most diﬃcult task in our empirical analysis is to estimate marginal abatement costs
21of carbon emissions for countries. Based on a survey of nine diﬀerent estimates in the USA
and Western Europe, Nordhaus (1991) derives the following logarithmic functional form as
the marginal abatement costs of the USA:
MCUSA(R) = ¡185:2 ¢ ln(1 ¡ R); (15)
in units of 1989 US dollar per ton of carbon where R is the rate of emissions reductions
(x=E)12.
Based on the estimation by Nordhaus, Bohm and Larsen (1994) derive marginal reduction
costs of carbon emissions for other countries. Their method is to obtain the marginal cost
function of emission reductions for other countries by modifying that of the USA, taking into
account the diﬀerences of countries’ carbon intensities (E=GDP). Let eUSA be the carbon
intensity of the USA (reference country). Bohm and Larsen assume that if any country l has
carbon intensity el lower than the USA, it has already taken appropriate measures to reduce
its carbon intensity. Thus, its marginal cost function starts at some higher level R0
l along
the MC-curve of the USA. Figure 2 illustrates the USA’s marginal cost function of emissions
reduction and the starting point R0
l for country l’s marginal cost.13 The curve is steeper at
R0
l than at the origin of the USA. The starting level R0
l is assumed to be




12In the above form, we assume zero intercept (Nordhaus estimates an intercept of ¡4:13).
13Figure 2 is also given in Okada (2002).
22Then, the marginal cost function of country l is computed as
MCl(Rl) = 185:2 ¢ ln(1 ¡ rl) ¡ 185:2 ¢ ln(1 ¡ rl ¡ Rl)




where Rl is the rate of emissions reduction by country l.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Similarly, if country h has carbon intensity eh higher than the USA, its marginal cost of
emissions reduction starts at some negative level R0
h along the MC-curve of the USA (see
Figure 2). The starting point R0
h of country h is assumed to be




The marginal cost function of country h can be given by the same formula as (17), that is,
MCh(Rh) = ¡185:2 ¢ ln(1 ¡ rh ¡ Rh) + 185:2 ¢ ln(1 ¡ rh)




where Rh is the rate of emissions reduction by country h. The curve is ﬂatter at rh than at
the origin of the USA.
Under the estimated marginal reduction costs of countries, we can obtain the explicit
formula of the competitive equilibrium of CO2 emissions trading (see Okada 2002).
23Proposition 3. Under the marginal cost functions (17) of emissions abatement and an
emission allocation ! = (!1;¢¢¢;!n), the equilibrium price p¤ of emissions, the equilibrium
reduction x¤
i of country i, and its equilibrium reduction cost ce
i(!i) are given by
p¤ = ¡185:2 ¢ ln[1 ¡
E ¡ ¯ !
Pn






j=1 Ej(1 ¡ rj)
(E ¡ ¯ !) (19)
ce
i(!i) = 185:2x¤
i + p¤(Eiri ¡ !i) (20)
where ri = 1 ¡ ei=eUSA if country i’s carbon intensity ei is lower than eUSA, and ri =
¡1 + eUSA=ei, otherwise.
Proof. By solving (2), (4) and (17), we can prove (18) and (19). Since the country i’s
equilibrium reduction cost Ci(x¤










= 185:2[Ei(1 ¡ ri) ¡ x¤







i ¡ Ei(1 ¡ ri)] + 185:2x¤
i;
we can prove (20) by (3). Q.E.D.
With help of Proposition 3, we can compute the competitive equilibrium of international
emissions trading among EU, FSU, Japan and USA. Table 1 shows all relevant data for 1990
24on these countries.14 Data includes
² carbon emissions (Ei)
² population (ni)
² gross domestic products (GDPi)
² carbon intensity (ei ´ Ei=GDPi)
It can be seen in Table 1 that carbon intensities are diverse among the major emitting
countries. EU and Japan have the lowest carbon intensities, and the FSU does the highest
one. The USA is in an intermediate position. This data implies that EU and Japan have
already took much eﬀorts to reduce carbon emissions in their domestic productions, and thus
that these countries have to bear high costs to satisfy reductions commitment by the Kyoto
Protocol if emissions trading is not allowed. Table 2 shows the reduction cost of each country
without emissions trading. EU bears the highest reduction costs ($991 million) without
emissions trading. The FSU does not bear any reduction costs.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
Table 3 summarizes numerical results on the competitive equilibrium of international
emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol. The eﬃcient reduction share among the four
countries are roughly 12% by EU, 47% by FSU, 4% by Japan and 37% by USA. The small
14Data sourses. (1) carbon emissions: Marland et al. (2001), (2) population: United Nations Demographic
Yearbook 1993 (population of FSU is compiled by Toyo Keizai Data Bank 1993). (3) GDP: United Nations
Statistical Yearbook 1998 (1993 for FSU).
25reduction share of EU and Japan reﬂects the fact that the marginal reduction costs of these
two countries are less than those of FSU and USA. The reduction shares of EU, Japan and
USA decrease compared to those without emissions trading. This fact means that these
three countries will be buyers of emissions in the trading. FSU will sell about $83 million
tons of emissions. It is remarkable that the total emissions reduction costs can be decreased
signiﬁcantly by emissions trading. The total saving costs amount to about $1030 million.
Looking at the saving cost of each country, EU enjoys the highest saving costs (about $470
million). The FSU can earn the proﬁt (about $400 million) by selling emissions. Japan also
beneﬁts from emissions trading, although its saving cost is not as large as EU. The saving
costs of the USA is marginal ($52 million). From this result, it can be said that EU and FSU
beneﬁt the most from the emissions trading. The equilibrium price of emissions is $9.45 per
carbon ton in the emissions trading among the four countries. In our previous study (Okada
2002), the equilibrium price of emissions is $6.27 among the three countries without EU. The
present numerical result shows that the emission price increases if EU, a big buyer, enters
the emissions market.
Insert Table 3 about here
We next consider how the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution can explain the actual
agreement of reduction rates in the Kyoto Protocol. To compute the Nash bargaining solu-
tion, we need data on the disagreement point d = (d1;¢¢¢;dn) of negotiations. Since we do
not have any reliable estimation on such data, we consider a converse question: what dis-
26agreement points can support the reduction rates in the Kyoto Protocol as the asymmetric






di ¡ c(¯ !)); for all i = EU, FSU, Japan, USA; (21)
where !i is the emission assigned to country i by the Kyoto Protocol, and ce
i(!i) is country
i’s equilibrium reduction costs given in Table 3. It should be noted that (21) includes three
independent linear equations. This means that there exist a continuum of solutions d =
(d1;¢¢¢;dn) for (21). Given the total disagreement costs ¯ d =
P4
i=1 di, (21) has a unique
solution of the disagreement point.
For the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, we consider three kinds of weights, equal
weight, population weight and GDP weight. The population (GDP, respectively) weight
determines countries’ weights to be proportional to their populations (GDPs, respectively).
According to Table 1, EU has the largest weight under both rules of population and GDP.
Japan has the smallest weight under the population rule, and FSU does under the GDP rule.
Table 4 gives several disagreement points which can support the reduction rates in the Kyoto
Protocol as the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with diﬀerent weights.
Insert Table 4 about here
The main ﬁndings of Table 4 are as follows. GDP gives a very low weight to the FSU.
This means that the bargaining power of the FSU is very low in the negotiation process.
Reﬂecting this fact, Table 4 shows that, in order for the Nash bargaining solution with the
27GDP weights to support the reduction rates in the Kyoto protocol, the FSU should earn
proﬁts when negotiations fail. Since this is an unlikely event, we can conclude that the Nash
bargaining solution with the GDP weights fails in explaining the agreement of the Kyoto
Protocol. In both the equal weights and the population weights, the disagreement costs
of EU and USA are larger than those of Japan and FSU. This means that if EU and USA
estimate highly their damages in the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, the reduction rates agreed
in the Kyoto Protocol can be supported as the asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions both
with the equal weights and with the population weights.
5 Conclusion
We have considered international negotiations on CO2 emissions reduction committed by
the Kyoto Protocol in the framework of game theory. Speciﬁcally, we have presented a non-
cooperative bargaining model of negotiations on emission reduction. The main theorem shows
that there exists a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) of the bargaining
model and that the equilibrium proposal by every country converges to the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution of emission reduction as the stopping probability of negotiations goes to
zero. In the model, one country is selected randomly as a proposer in the beginning of every
round. It is proved that the weight of every country for the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution is determined by the probability to be selected as a proposer. This result implies
that the bargaining power of a country emerges from the opportunity to make a proposal in
28the bargaining process.
In the last part of the paper, we have considered by empirical data on the four major
emitting countries how the formal model of the Nash bargaining solution can explain the
actual agreement of reduction rates in the Kyoto protocol. We have computed the competitive
equilibrium of emission trading among EU, FSU, Japan and USA based on the estimation
of these countries’ marginal costs of emissions reduction in the literature. The numerical
results are summarized as follows. The emission price is $9.45 per carbon ton. EU, Japan
and USA buy in total about 83 million tons of emissions from FSU. FSU earns about $400
million from trading. The emission trading reduces signiﬁcantly the total reduction costs for
the four countries. The total saving costs amount to $1030 million. Regarding the saving
costs of individual countries, EU enjoys the highest saving costs ($470 million) and Japan the
second highest ($110 million). USA has the least saving costs ($52 million). The numerical
results show that if the equal weight or the population weight is employed, the asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution can support the reduction rates in the Kyoto protocol when EU
and USA evaluate their damages in the failure of negotiations greater than Japan and FSU.
The Nash bargaining solution with the GDP weight fails in explaining the actual agreement
of reduction rates. The main reason is that the bargaining power of FSU is very low under
the GDP rule, while the Kyoto protocol gives FSU a favored outcome of the zero reduction
for its participation in the protocol.
In addition to the numerical results, some political events before and after the Kyoto
conference seem to support the result of the formal model in this paper. Before the Kyoto
conference, EU, Japan and USA made three major proposals with the intention to aﬀect the
agreement in the conference in their favorable way.. EU made an early proposal to reduce
2915% below 1990 levels by 2010. They also proposed a “bubble” approach that would group
all the European nations together in reduction commitments. Japan proposed a 5% reduc-
tion claiming to diﬀerentiate individual countires based on emissions per GDP, emissions per
capita and population. USA proposed that developped countries should reduce their green-
house gases to 1990 levels by 2008-2012 and that developping countries should participate
in emission reductions in a meaningful way. It is conceivable that these proposals increase
the bargaining power of the three countries. After the Kyoto conference, the USA led by
the new Republican president changed its policy to oppose the Kyoto protocol (March 2001).
The deviation of the USA from the Kyoto protocol is indicated by our numerical result that
its reduction cost by emissions trading is marginal ($52 million). There is no evidence that
USA estimates highly its damage in the failure of negotiations. It is argued that an early
commitment to reduce emissions would result in serious harm to the economy of the USA.
Finally, our analysis shows the usefulness of and the limitation of a game theoretic ap-
proach to international negotiations on climate change. Game theory enables us to under-
stand strategic conﬂicts in the international negotiations on emission reduction. On the other
hand, if one wants to derive some practical implications from the game theoretic analysis,
reliable estimations of model parameters are necessary. In our model, we need to estimate
countries’ damages in the failure of negotiations on the Kyoto protocol. Although this is not
an easy task at all, further empirical studies on international negotiations based on game
theoretic models should be done in the future research.
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